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ABSTRACT 
Malicious software (malware) has a wide variety of analysis avoidance techniques 
that it can employ to hinder forensic analysis. Although legitimate software can 
incorporate the same analysis avoidance techniques to provide a measure of 
protection against reverse engineering and to protect intellectual property, 
malware invariably makes much greater use of such techniques to make detailed 
analysis labour intensive and very time consuming. Analysis avoidance 
techniques are so heavily used by malware that the detection of the use of analysis 
avoidance techniques could be a very good indicator of the presence of malicious 
intent. However, there is a tendency for analysis tools to focus on hiding the 
presence of the tool itself from being detected by the malware, and not on 
recording the detection and recording of analysis avoidance techniques. In 
addition, the coverage of anti-anti-analysis techniques in common tools and 
plugins is much less than the number of analysis avoidance techniques that exist. 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the discovery of the intent of 
deception may be a very good indicator of an underlying malicious objective of 
the software under investigation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern malicious software (malware) employs stealth and deception techniques 
in an attempt to remain undetected on computer systems and difficult to fully 
analyse (Harbour 2007). Legitimate software can employ anti-analysis techniques 
to hinder reverse engineering attempts and to protect intellectual property (IP). 
However, software with a malicious intent may be considered to be far more 
likely to employ anti-analysis techniques than legitimate software (Vuksan, 
Peričin et al. 2009), to the extent that, detection of the presence of anti-analysis 
techniques may indicate the presence of malware (Wysopal 2009).  
Initial static analysis of code may quickly reveal the presence of obfuscation or 
other high level anti-static analysis techniques.  However, malware can be so 
heavily obfuscated that static analysis alone may reveal very little information of 
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benefit to the digital forensic analyst. Equally, malware that is executing has 
every opportunity to examine the environment it is running in and alter its 
behaviour if it detects that dynamic analysis is being conducted. In such cases, it 
may use deception to hide its true functionality and intent.  
Executing code exhibits complex dynamic behaviour, making the detection of 
anti-dynamic analysis techniques more difficult. This is because numerous paths 
of execution are available, any of which are generally preceded by conditional 
branch logic that alters the path of execution based on the results of preceding 
code that may include analysis detection routines. If the preceding code to the 
branch contains code used to detect the analysis environment, the alternate path to 
deceptive code could very well lead to the path of execution where the true intent 
of the code is performed. Such a path could reveal the true intent of the malware. 
In addition, an execution path of deception may include any number of 
destructive acts that hinder the collection of evidence. The detection of the use of 
anti-analysis techniques could assist the digital forensic investigator to reveal 
intent.  
2. ANALYSIS AVOIDANCE 
An extensive array of techniques is available to programmers to hinder attempts at 
reverse engineering their code in an endeavour to protect intellectual property 
(Falliere 2007; Yason 2007; Ferrie 2008). These very same techniques are 
employed by malicious software (malware) to hinder digital forensic analysis. 
Malware analysis is core business to the anti-virus (AV) industry, who work to 
extract signatures from the malware for the purpose of threat detection, and to 
formulate eradication strategies. However, the resultant recognition rules and 
signatures may provide very little benefit to the forensic analyst. This is because 
the rules of recognition are generally dependent upon a malware analyst having 
already extracted suitable recognition rules, whether the rules are signature and/or 
heuristics based. Anti-virus software may be of very little benefit to assist the 
forensic investigator in the identification of the intent of malware.  The detection 
performance of AV software has been shown by a number of researchers to be far 
less than ideal (Rutkowska 2006; Yin, Song et al. 2007; Yan, Zhang et al. 2008; 
Zhou and Meador Inge 2008). If the malware has not been analysed before, then it 
is highly unlikely that rules of recognition exist. This is especially true of 
malicious, customized malware that is targeting individuals or specific 
organisations that is not circulating via the internet. In such cases, the digital 
forensic analyst may be required to analyse the malware in detail. Although 
online analysis engines exist, it may not be prudent to submit malicious code to 
such sites, particularly when confidentiality must be maintained. This is because 
online analysis engines typically share submitted samples with AV companies. 
Online analysis engines are available that can provide very useful reports such as 
detected virus signatures, file activities, registry activities, process activities, 
service activities and network activities. Online analysis engines such as Anubis 
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(International Secure Systems Lab, Vienna University of Technology et al. 2008) 
have limitations (Bayer 2009), such as the virtual machines in which the dynamic 
analysis is being conducted being detected (Innes and Valli 2006; Smith and 
Quist 2006). This is because virtual machines do not perfectly emulate the 
operating system, and attackers need only determine small differences in the 
environment to detect the presence of a virtual machine.  Understandably, online 
analysis engines incorporate a time out period to limit the time allocated to 
analysis. Malware need only wait a certain period greater than the time out period 
to hinder detection by such engines. Since the engines are automated, a simple 
check which malware can use to detect it is running inside known engines is to 
read the environment and compare the results against known baselines of 
common analysis engines.  Once the analysis environment has been detected, the 
malware can branch to deception code, or choose not to run at all. Another 
limitation is that only a single path of execution is executed and alternate, 
significant paths of execution that show the intent of the malware may be missed 
entirely (Bayer 2009). This is not to say that online analysis engines cannot 
provide fruitful results, but the digital forensic analyst needs to be aware of the 
limitations of the use of such tools. Commercial analysis engines are available 
that may provide the analyst more control over the parameters of analysis than the 
online variety. A series of articles by Hudak (2009; Hudak 2009) provides an 
introduction to automating malware analysis that can be further customized and 
extended by using additional tools and scripts. Advantages of establishing a 
customized analysis service for forensic investigation is that the use of analysis 
avoidance detection scripts that log deception events can be developed.  
Debuggers such as OllyDbg (Yuschuk 2008) and IDA Pro (Hex-Rays 2008) are 
commonly used for the analysis of malware. Plugins such as Olly Advanced 
(MaRKuS 2006) for OllyDbg and IDA Stealth (Newger 2008) for IDA Pro focus 
on hiding the presence of the tool from the software under investigation, in an 
effort to avoid detection. Unfortunately, the number of anti analysis techniques 
covered by the plugins is far less than the number of analysis avoidance 
techniques that are available. In addition, the plugins do not generally log the 
detection of analysis avoidance techniques.  
3. SPECIFIC DECEPTION TECHNIQUES 
The following subsections outline a simple taxonomy of deception techniques, 
together with references on how they can be detected and mitigated. It is 
important to note that these techniques can be employed in various combinations 
and will not likely be encountered in isolation. 
3.1 Anti-Emulation 
Virtual machines offer many advantages to the forensic analyst such as the ability 
to quickly restore images to a known state. A range of techniques exist to detect 
that the malware is running inside a virtual machine such as VMWare or Virtual 
PC (Innes and Valli 2006; Smith and Quist 2006). The use of these techniques can 
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be detected and mitigated (Eagle 2004). In critical cases, or where the use of anti-
emulation techniques cannot be mitigated due to various constraints, it may be 
prudent to use a real machine rather than a virtual machine.  
3.2 Anti-Online Analysis 
A variety of online analysis engines are available to the forensic analyst such as 
Anubis and Norman Sandbox. An advantage of these engines is that they can give 
very good reports on the functionality of the malware. However, there are 
limitations that the analyst needs to be aware of. The analysis engine may not 
match the desired target environment of the malware, triggering behaviour may 
be missed, only single paths of execution are typically examined, analysis is time 
limited and a variety of methods are available to detect the analysis environment 
(Bayer 2009). Due to confidentiality concerns, it may also not be wise to submit 
malware where there is no guarantee that the malware will not be shared with a 
variety of researchers and AV companies. Commercial products of some of these 
engines are also available that can be purchased and configured in the analysts 
premises such that malware need not leave the laboratory (Norman 2009).  
However, the focus of the engine may be limited to the reporting of behaviour and 
not necessarily on the detection of deception. Tailored, automated analysis 
environments can be established (Hudak 2009; Hudak 2009). Such an 
environment could be used to include specialised environments that closely 
resemble the original targeted environment of the malware together with the same 
operating system version, service patch level, installed software, peripheral 
equipment, attached subsystems, emulated or real loads and services. An example 
of such a tailored environment could be an emulation of a Critical Infrastructure 
system. 
3.3 Anti-Hardware 
Malware can use a variety of techniques to detect if it is being analysed by taking 
advantage of the way hardware such as the CPU and registers are used during 
debugging sessions. This can include techniques to exploit the way the prefetch 
queue works when software is being debugged and by execution timing. The use 
of these techniques can be detected by using appropriate techniques (Ferrie 2008).  
3.4 Anti-Debugger 
A plethora of opportunities exist to malware to determine if it is running in a 
debugger and to employ deception if it detects that it is being analysed. These 
techniques target the way debuggers work and use this to take control of the flow 
of execution of the code. A number of structures are associated with any loaded 
program. Bits set in these structures can be examined by running malcode to 
determine if it is being debugged (Falliere 2007; Yason 2007; Ferrie 2008). 
Debuggers can be scripted to detect the use of these techniques and mitigate them 
as the programs are running (Eagle 2008; Seitz 2009). Scripts to perform such 
tasks can also be found on a number of reverse engineering websites for a variety 
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of debuggers in a number of different scripting languages. Techniques employed 
in one language can be converted and extended to the analyst’s language of 
choice. It is advisable to learn a number of scripting languages to take advantage 
of this situation.  
3.5 Anti-Disassemblers 
These techniques target the way disassemblers work to produce false 
disassemblies. Two methods used by disassemblers are linear sweep and 
recursive traversal. Linear sweep is used by the disassemblers/debuggers SoftIce 
(Compuware 2008) and WinDbg (Microsoft 2008), which conduct disassembly in 
a sequential manner. Recursive traversal in contrast (used by OllyDbg and IDA 
Pro), follows the flow of each branch and is more tolerant to anti-disassembly 
tricks. Linear sweeps can be easily confused with junk bytes, but the recursive 
sweep technique can also be fooled with opaque predicates (Eilam 2005). Opaque 
predicates are simply code that appears to make a decision that could alter 
program flow. But in reality, only one branch of execution is possible to follow.  
Detection of the use of this technique can be assisted by comparing the results of 
disassemblies from various disassemblers. If the results vary considerably, an 
instance of deception may have been discovered. The point of implementation is 
likely to be at the point of divergence between similarities testing of resultant 
disassemblies.  
3.6 Anti-Tools 
Tools used by the analyst can be detected by the running malware. If discovered, 
the malware may enter a deceptive mode. Malware may even use weaknesses or 
vulnerabilities of the tools against themselves to give the malware another 
opportunity to employ deception. Packers and protectors can include options to 
detect popular tools such as OllyDbg and IDA Pro as well as the popular online 
analysis engines (Bayer 2009). Specific techniques can be uncovered by scripting 
to search for the use of the techniques or can be discovered by comparing results 
from the use of different tools.  
3.7 Anti-Memory 
Dumping of memory can be useful for the malware analyst after letting 
obfuscated programs unpack themselves. This is achieved by catching and halting 
the program at the moment the unpacking stops, and then dumping the unpacked 
program from memory. This allows the code to then be analysed. Packers can 
make this dumping process less useful by deleting a section of code as soon as it 
has finished executing. This technique is known as “stolen bytes”. These bytes 
must be restored if the dumped program is to be run again. 
3.8 Anti-Process 
Techniques can be used to target the way processes are handled whilst being 
debugged. An example of this is exploiting the way Thread Local Storage (TLS) 
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is used. This technique is used to change the original entry point of a program to a 
different entry point so that an initial check can be made to see if a debugger or 
other analysis tools are being run. It changes the Portable Executable (PE) loader 
so that the entry point of the program is referenced in Thread Local Storage 
(TLS), which is the 10th directory entry in the optional PE header (Falliere 2007). 
TLS callbacks can be identified by examining the Data Directory of the PE header 
using a tool such as pedump (Pietrek n.d.) because it will show if a TLS directory 
is in the executable and these can be examined for malicious intent (Yason 2007) 
3.9 Anti-Analysis 
Various techniques can be used to target the way analysis is conducted. Deceptive 
practices include transformations of the original code to make the resultant code 
harder to read. Transformation characteristics include potency, which is the level 
of complexity added to the code and can be measured by complexity metrics. This 
includes measuring the depth of nesting in a particular sequence and the number 
of predicates the code contains. Another characteristic is that the transformation 
must be resilient. A highly resilient transformation is hard to undo. Deobfuscators 
can conduct data-flow analysis to reverse the transformation. There is also a cost 
characteristic of the obfuscation transformation in terms of increased size of the 
resultant code and slower execution time (Eilam 2005). 
3.10 Packers and Protectors 
Packers and protectors make static analysis of software difficult because the 
actual code instructions and data is not able to be read until the code has been 
unpacked. It is very similar to compression. Unpackers exist for many packers in 
the form of scripts and plugins for debuggers. Packed programs can also be 
unpacked manually by using a debugger. The unpacked code can then be 
analysed with a debugger such as IDA Pro, or Ollydbg. If malware to be analysed 
has been packed by an unknown packer, it can often be loaded into memory, and 
then process dumped using LordPE (yoda 2005) or any other memory dumping 
tool. It should be noted that the code may use techniques to determine if a 
debugger is being used and respond by protecting itself using some combination 
of the anti forensic techniques that have been discussed in this paper. The analyst 
needs to be in a position to statically analyse the executable as soon as it has 
unpacked itself, by starting analysis at the Original Entry Point (OEP), otherwise 
code can be written over and evidence overlooked. Packer signature detectors 
compare the Entry Point of the code against known signatures to try to determine 
the type of packer used. However, deception may be employed by incorporating a 
false signature, and/or by implementing the real unpacker much further into the 
code than the Entry Point. Packers may even use multiple levels of packing. 
Measurement of entropy is a very good indicator of packing (Mandiant 2007).  
3.11 Root Kits 
Windows uses four privilege levels, known as rings, to determine the access level 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 5(4) 
 
37 
 
for access control. Access control determines how hardware can be accessed, 
what instructions a process may use, what files may be modified and which areas 
of memory can be accessed or changed. Ring 0 is the most privileged level and 
Ring 3 has the least amount of privilege. Most applications users run are run in 
Ring 3 and these applications cannot access hardware directly and have limited 
access to memory. Ring 3 is often referred to as “user land”. Ring 0 applications 
run with full system privileges and can perform Input/Output (I/O), memory 
management, run device drivers, execute privileged instructions, access all 
memory space, access all hardware and access all components of the kernel. This 
is often referred to as “kernel land”. A special mechanism exists so that a user 
land program can access kernel land in a controlled fashion so that device drivers 
(*.sys file) can be installed. Root kits exploit this mechanism so that they can 
install their own device driver into kernel land, giving their program full 
privileges at Ring 0 and hence control the environment in which other software 
runs. In this way, it can avoid detection (Hoglund and Butler 2005). 
4. RECOMMENDED ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
An iterative and recursive methodology that alternately uses static and dynamic 
analysis techniques to discover and mitigate anti forensic techniques has been 
proposed from the conduct of this research. Essentially it extends a malware 
analysis methodology discussed by Zeltser (2007) in which static and dynamic 
analysis phases are interspersed with the moulding of the analysis environment 
such that the behaviour of the malware can be determined. The proposed spiral 
analysis methodology, depicted in Figure 1, extends Zelter’s methodology by 
adding focus to the detection and mitigation of anti-analysis techniques. This is 
because the use of such techniques could be considered to be precursors of intent 
to employ deception in the code and assists in the detection of the use of 
deception. It also allows the analyst to zero in on regions of interest more quickly. 
Another view of this methodology is presented in Figure 2 in the form of a 
process diagram that could be implemented in software. It shows malware under 
investigation as the input to the process that employs the spiral analysis 
methodology and that a manual, semi-automated or automated analysis control 
supervisor as central to the analysis, where recording, processing and reporting is 
managed. The supervisor function interacts with each phase by providing control 
over the constituent steps in each phase. It also acts as the recipient of data which 
is produced by each phase which is required to make decisions on how to tailor 
the subsequent phases.   
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Figure 1 A proposed Spiral Analysis Methodology for determining 
whether a program may be malicious, based on obfuscation or other 
similar techniques 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Process Diagram - Implementation of Spiral Analysis 
Methodology 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 5(4) 
 
39 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Malware is invariably heavily obfuscated and static analysis may provide little 
benefit if conducted in isolation from dynamic analysis. The benefits of dynamic 
analysis can also be subverted if the running code is treated as a ‘black box’ 
where only inputs and outputs are measured and internal inspection of the binary 
code is not performed. This is because the malware can detect that it is being 
analysed and can use deception techniques to deceive the analyst.  
The discovery of deception in software under investigation may be a very good 
indicator of malicious intent. Although legitimate software can use the same 
techniques to protect intellectual property, malicious software uses anti analysis 
techniques so much, that detection of such techniques may prove to be a strong 
indicator of malicious intent. The digital forensic analyst may have to perform 
analysis of the software under investigation themselves because detection by AV 
software may provide less than ideal results. In addition, submission of suspicious 
files to online analysis engines may breach confidentiality agreements. This leads 
to the forensic analyst having to perform analysis of suspicious files in the lab. 
Although this can potentially be a very labour intensive activity, it can be assisted 
by the use of an appropriate technique such as the proposed spiral analysis 
methodology where anti-analysis techniques are detected, recorded and mitigated 
as analysis proceeds. 
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